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The effect of globalization on union bargaining
and price-cost margins of firms
Filip Abraham Æ Jozef Konings Æ Stijn Vanormelingen
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 Kiel Institute 2009
Abstract In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of
economic integration. This paper analyzes how increased economic integration has
affected labor and product markets. We use a panel of Belgian manufacturing firms
to estimate price-cost margins and union bargaining power and show how various
measures of globalization affect them. Import competition puts pressure on both
markups and union bargaining power, especially when there is increased competi-
tion from low wage countries. This suggests that increased globalization is
associated with a moderation of wage claims in unionized countries, which should
be associated with positive effects on employment.
Keywords Markups  Trade unions  International trade
JEL Classification F16  J50  L13
1 Introduction
In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic
integration: Within the European Union (EU) market barriers were removed, the
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euro was introduced in twelve member states and ten new member states joined the
EU in 2004. On a global level, the EU is confronted with the rapid development of
several Asian countries, the membership of China in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the emergence of China and India as new world powers. This trend
towards market integration and globalization opens up European economies to
international trade and foreign competition. According to Eurostat figures total trade
in the EU as a percentage of GDP has gone up substantially compared to 1992 and
especially so between the EU and the rest of the world. At the same time, the
regional pattern of trade has been shifting. In 1992 only 4% of total extra-EU
imports came from China. By 2003 the Chinese market share had increased to 10%.
Likewise, the share of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEEC) in extra EU-15 imports attained 16% in 2003. Such figures imply that trade
flows from low wage regions have gained substantial ground in a relatively short
period of time.
In recent years, many papers have been written on the role globalization has had
on wage and employment outcomes. Most papers, however, find only limited effects
of international trade on wages but larger effects on employment, especially for
European labor markets. This is most likely due to the more rigid nature of wages
and wage setting institutions in Europe.1 This wage setting process typically
depends on factors such as the monetary policy regime, the integration of product
markets, the existence of collective agreements and the bargaining power of unions
and employers. Globalization affects these factors through various channels. As
Rodrik (1997) points out, globalization weakens the bargaining position of trade
unions as it increases the substitutability of employees. Furthermore, globalization
is likely to put downward pressure on price-cost margins, which limits the scope of
rent sharing with trade unions. Such interactions between product and labor markets
are emphasized in various macro models that show how more competitive pricing in
the product market has beneficial effects, such as lower unemployment rates, on
labor market outcomes (e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
This paper adds to this literature in various ways. First, we simultaneously
estimate price-cost margins and union bargaining power. Most papers study
imperfections in product and labor markets separately.2 However, ignoring labor
market imperfections when measuring competitiveness in the product market, leads
to product market power being underestimated. We follow a production function
approach as in Hall (1988) and extended by Cre´pon et al. (2007) to estimate price-
cost margins and bargaining power. We apply the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to
deal with the endogeneity of productivity shocks. Second, we analyze how price
setting and bargaining power is affected by globalization, for which we use several
measures including import penetration, outsourcing and foreign direct investment.
Third, we use Belgium firm level data in our analysis. This has a number of
advantages. Belgium is characterized by strong labor unions and rigid product
markets. It therefore provides an interesting benchmark to test how international
1 For a nice overview of these studies see Part II of Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (2005).
2 Exceptions are Bughin (1993, 1996), Konings and Walsh (1994), Cre´pon et al. (2007), Dobbelaere
(2004), Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2008) and Boulhol et al. (2007).
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integration affects a small regulated economy in the core of the EU. Moreover the
firm level data available are unusually rich. Our data set includes all firms between
1996 and 2004 that have to submit by Belgian law full or abbreviated company
accounts. In light of the recent insights of Melitz (2003) and others on the role of
firm heterogeneity in international trade it seems natural to use micro data to model
the effects of international competition. Finally, Belgium is characterized by a
substantial increase in its volume of trade. The value of trade in Belgium has
increased with almost 70% during the last decade, while the value of output rose
only with 40%. As a consequence most manufacturing sectors experienced a rising
import penetration between 1997 and 2004.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we develop a stylized theoretical
framework that captures the effects of international competition on price-cost
margins and labor market outcomes. Sect. 3 introduces the model that we seek to
estimate and discusses the estimation strategy. Sect. 4 discusses the results and
Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
2 The effects of globalization: theoretical background
To focus ideas it is useful to introduce a standard benchmark model with one
production factor labor (Blanchard 2005). The model illustrates how interactions
between the product and the labor market matter for understanding equilibrium
unemployment. It is built around two crucial equations, the first being a wage-
setting relation, the second a price-setting relation.
Turning to the wage equation first, let the nominal wage level depend on the
actual price level (P)3 and on a function that captures the institutional factors that
determine wages or
W ¼ PF u; zð Þ; ð1Þ
where W stands for the nominal wage, u for the unemployment rate and z for all
other factors affecting the wage. Typically, the unemployment rate exerts a negative
influence on the wage. The intuition is straightforward: a higher unemployment rate
weakens the bargaining position of workers and so lowers the wage.
A similar equation can be derived for the price-setting behavior of firms.
Consider a firm that produces goods using labor as the only factor of production.
If labor productivity is constant, the production function can be written as Y = L
and marginal cost of production is equal to W. To keep things simple, we assume
that prices are set as a simple markup over the wage or
P ¼ lW : ð2Þ
In Eq. 2 the degree of competition in the product market plays a determining
role. In a non-competitive product market, prices are set significantly higher than
marginal cost (W in this model) resulting in a large markup l. In a perfectly
3 Typically, it depends on the expected price level, but for simplicity we assume that the expected prices
are equal to the actual prices. In the Belgian context of wage indexation this is a reasonable assumption.
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competitive market, l = 1 and prices are fully determined by the wage (hence the
real wage W/P reaches a maximum value equal to 1).
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium point A in this simple economy, where the price-
setting relation is equal to the wage-setting relation. Through its impact on the
markup l, the degree of competition in the product market has an impact on the
equilibrium unemployment rate. Hence, characteristics of the product market affect
the equilibrium outcome in the labor market.
How does economic integration in the product market affect the labor market in
this simple framework? A variety of theoretical models show that economic
integration causes l to fall, e.g., when integration makes more product varieties
available (Krugman 1979; cf. Chen et al. (2009) for a recent application) In Fig. 1
international competition therefore shifts the price-setting equation upwards: for
given wage levels, prices are lower and hence real wage costs for firms rise to a
level closer to the competitive benchmark. As a consequence, profit rates for
individual companies decline. In addition, international economic integration
changes the wage-setting relationship. For a given unemployment rate, lower profit
rates translate in smaller rents that can be redistributed to union members. If
globalization moreover implies that multinational enterprises can shift employment
across affiliates more easily,4 then the bargaining power of workers will decline. All
of this will force union members to accept wage moderation, shifting the wage
setting curve down. The new equilibrium is found in B. Compared to the initial
equilibrium in A, equilibrium unemployment has gone down, prices and nominal
wages are lower and the markup l0 of prices over wage costs has been reduced.
The bottom-line from this analysis is that interactions between product and labor
markets matter for understanding equilibrium unemployment of an economy. It is
also clear though that the effects of international competition depend very much on
u
P
W
Price setting1
u
),( zuF
,( )zuF
A
B1
u
Fig. 1 Interaction between labor market and product market
4 Recent evidence confirms that multinational enterprises do relocate employment across affiliates, for
the United States see Brainard and Riker (1997) and Hanson et al. (2005), for Europe see Braconier and
Ekholm (2000) and Konings and Murphy (2006).
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the slopes and the responsiveness of the wage and price-setting relations in the
economy, which is ultimately an empirical question. This is what we take up in the
rest of the paper.
3 Empirical model and methodology
In the previous section we presented a model to illustrate that imperfections in
product and input markets are interlinked. To get an idea of these imperfections and
assess the impact of globalization on them, a more structural model is needed. We
rely on the work of Hall (1988) who showed that the Solow residual, used to
measure productivity growth, should be corrected for imperfect competition in the
product market. It thereby offers a method to estimate the price-cost margin without
observing prices and marginal costs directly. Starting from a production function
where output Qit of firm i in year t is produced from three inputs, namely labor Lit,
capital Kit and materials Mit:
Qit ¼ AitF Lit; Kit; Mitð Þ; ð3Þ
where Ait captures Hicks neutral technological progress. The function F(.) is
homogeneous of degree 1 ? k for all input factors, i.e., the returns to scale are
1 ? k. F(.) can exhibit decreasing (k\ 0), constant (k\ 0) or increasing (k\ 0)
returns to scale. Expressing Eq. 3 in growth rates:
Dqit ¼ eLitD litð Þ þ eMit D mitð Þ þ eKit Dkit þ Dait: ð4Þ
The variables qit, lit, mit, kit and ait are the natural logarithms of Qit, Lit, Mit, Kit
and Ait respectively. eXit is the elasticity of output with respect to input X, namely
eXit ¼ oQitoXit XitQit : The first-order conditions for a profit maximizing firm imply that eXit ¼
litaX;it; where lit = Pit/MCit or the markup at the output market and aX,it is the cost
share in total revenue of input X, i.e.,
PXit Xit
PitQit
(X = L, M, K). The cost share in total
revenue of input X underestimates the input elasticity if markets are not perfectly
competitive (lit [ 1). Replacing input elasticities with their adjusted factor shares
gives the following expression:
D qit  kitð Þ ¼ lit aL;itD lit  kitð Þ þ aM;itD mit  kitð Þ
 þ kitDkit þ Dait: ð5Þ
Here we use the fact that returns to scale are 1 þ kitð Þ ¼ eKit þ eLit þ eMit and as
such elasticity of output with respect to capital can be expressed as eKit ¼
1 þ kitð Þ  litaL;it  litaM;it: This avoids the problematic computation of the user
cost of capital in our empirical analysis. Equation 5 can also be written as
SRit ¼ bitLERit þ
kit
lit
Dkit þ 1  bitð ÞDait; ð6Þ
where bit is the Lerner index (bit = (Pit - MCit)/Pit = 1 - (1/lit)) SRit : D(qit
- kit) - (aL,itD(lit - kit) ? aM,itD(mit - kit)), the classic Solow residual and
LERit : D(qit - kit). From this equation the Lerner index and returns to scale
can be estimated. Note that by the use of first differences, any firm-specific fixed
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effect from the level equation is eliminated. This framework has been used to
estimate the impact of trade liberalization on market power of firms in a number
of papers, starting with Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey and Harrison (1994) for
Coˆte-d’-Ivoir and more recently by Konings et al. (2001, 2005) for a number of
industrialized and emerging economies.
As pointed out by Cre´pon et al. (2007), one potential problem of this framework
is that it assumes competitive labor markets. However, most European countries are
characterized by labor markets where negotiations between unions and firms take
place. We therefore follow Cre´pon et al. (2007) to incorporate a model of efficient
bargaining in the above framework. In this model unions and firms bargain over
both wages and employment.5 Unions are assumed to be utilitarian and their
objective is to maximize the amount of rent sharing Lit(wit - wa,it) with wa,it
the reservation wage.6 The firm objective is to maximize its short run profits
PitQit - witLit. Note that for now we assume there is no other variable input factor
than labor, so we assume the materials and capital input to be fixed at the point of
the bargaining, which is consistent with a firm making investment and material
purchases decisions before the bargaining takes place. This does not affect the
bargaining outcome as long as the union preferences do not depend on these inputs
(Bughin 1993, 1996).7 Whether materials or capital are assumed to be fixed or
flexible, the amount of both inputs will be chosen such that their marginal revenue
product equals their price. The solution to the bargaining problem is given by
maximization of the generalized Nash bargain:
max
w;L
X ¼ Lit wit  wa;it
  Uit PitQit  witLitð Þ1Uit ; ð7Þ
where U is the union bargaining power; 0 B U B 1. Derivation of the bargaining
equation with respect to wage and employment gives the following first-order
conditions:
wit ¼ 1  Uitð Þwa;it þ Uit PitQit
Lit
; ð8Þ
wit ¼ Uit
1  Uit
PitQit  witLit
Lit
 
þ RL;it with RL;it ¼ o PitQitð ÞoLit : ð9Þ
5 It is rarely observed in reality that union and firm bargain over the absolute level of employment (Booth
1995). However, negotiations over work practices and crew size are common practice which influences
the labor-capital ratio. When capital is fixed at the moment of the bargain, bargaining over L/K is the
same as bargaining over the absolute level of employment. Moreover, even if capital is a variable input,
bargaining over crew size will also lead to an outcome on a contract curve to the right of the labor demand
curve (Clark 1990).
6 For ease of notation we assume workers are risk-neutral. The outcome is exactly the same when this
assumption is relaxed (cf. Boulhol et al. 2007).
7 We also experimented with a different specification such that the profit of the firm that is bargained
over equals (PQ-zM-wL) like in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2008), with z the price of materials. Under
these assumptions (10) becomes. eL ¼ laL þ l U01U0 aL þ aM  1ð Þ and we expect to find empirically a
higher union bargaining power because the rents that are bargained over are now net of both labor and
material expenses. The same reasoning can be applied when capital is assumed to be a variable input
factor.
18 F. Abraham et al.
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Solving these two expressions simultaneously gives an expression for the
contract curve, RL,it = wa,it. Using RL;it ¼ oðPitQitÞoQit
oQit
oLit
¼ Pitlit
oQit
oLit
together with Eq. 8
and the expression for the contract curve, one can find that
eL;it ¼ litaL;it þ lit
Uit
1  Uit aL;it  1
 
: ð10Þ
Note that the right-to-manage bargaining model, where the union and the firm
bargain over wages and the firm is free to set the level of labor, results in a point
wRTMit ; L
RTM
it
 
on the labor demand curve. Consequently, the elasticity of output
with respect to labor would be equal to the labor cost share in total revenue adjusted
for the markup, i.e., eL,it = litaL,it and Eq. 6 would not change such that the
bargaining power would be estimated to be equal to zero.
Combining Eqs. 4 and 10, an extra term which captures the union bargaining
power appears in Eq. 6 or
SRit ¼ bitLERit þ
kit
lit
Dkit þ Uit
1  Uit BARit þ 1  bitð ÞDait; ; ð11Þ
with BARit : (aL,it - 1)D(lit - kit). This will be our basic equation used in the
further analysis and allows us to estimate price-cost margins and bargaining power
simultaneously without having to make assumptions about the alternative wage rate.
Cre´pon et al. (2007) show that in this setting the price-cost markup must be
interpreted as the ratio of price over cost evaluated at the alternative wage instead of
the bargained wage. This follows from the fact that in the efficient bargaining
framework marginal revenue of labor equals the alternative wage. As a result, the
firm makes input and output decisions as if it was maximizing profit computed at the
alternative wage.
A potential problem with estimating Eq. 11 is the endogeneity of the unobserved
productivity shock, Dait. Since lit is a variable input, it depends on the productivity
ait in the same period. As a result Dlit is correlated with Dait and OLS estimates of
the bargaining term are likely to be biased. Similarly, Dqit will be correlated with
Dait because higher productivity will lead to higher output.
One solution is to use an instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, it is
often difficult to come up with appropriate instruments. Our alternative approach is
based on recent findings of the productivity literature, more specifically on the
methodology to estimate production functions developed by Olley and Pakes
(1996). We follow Hoekman and Kee (2007) and De Loecker and Warzynski
(2009), who have applied this methodology to estimate price-cost margins. This
approach proxies the unobservable productivity shock by a polynomial in capital
and investment, both in present and lagged values. The methodology yields
consistent estimates for the Lerner index and for union bargaining power. However,
it does not allow a separate identification of the returns to scale parameter because
the productivity shock is proxied by a polynomial in capital and investment which
also absorbs the returns to scale parameter. This is not a major problem since our
main interest lies in identifying the price-cost margins and union bargaining power.
The drawback of applying the Olley and Pakes correction is that only observations
with positive investment can be used, which reduces our sample size considerably.
The effect of globalization on union bargaining 19
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4 Data and results
4.1 Data
Firm data are taken from the Belfirst database. The database includes the full
company accounts of every Belgian firm that has to report to the tax authorities.
For our analysis we selected the whole manufacturing sector (NACE code 15 to
36) with the exception of the recycling sector. We retrieved data for the period
1996–2004. The variables used for the analysis are turnover, tangible fixed
assets, number of employees (in full time equivalents), wage bill and material
costs (raw materials, consumables and services). Turnover is deflated with a
Producer Price Index (PPI) at the 3-digit NACE level provided by Eurostat. If
this PPI was not available for the sector, a 2-digit NACE deflator was used.
Tangible fixed assets are deflated using a countrywide investment deflator and
material costs are deflated with a NACE 2-digit intermediate goods deflator,
constructed from input–output tables. The database provides also information
about the ownership structure, so we are able to determine whether a firm has a
foreign owner. However we only observe ownership in 2004. Imports by country
of origin, are made available by the National Bank of Belgium also at the 4-digit
NACE level.
In order for a firm to be added to the sample, we required at least three
consecutive observations in our sample. In addition, we dropped observations which
seemed to be obvious data input mistakes (such as firms with negative wage costs),
observations for which the growth rates in inputs and output were unrealistically
high and firms which reported labor costs to be higher than gross value added. Our
final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 6,125 firms and in total 35,222
observations. In Table 1 we report summary statistics. The median firm has 17
employees, earns a revenue of 3.05 million euros and faces a labor cost of 34,100
euros per employee per year. The labor cost share in total turnover is about 22% in
the average manufacturing firm.
4.2 Estimation results for the markup and bargaining power
We start by estimating Eqs. 6 and 11 to first obtain an estimate of the average
markup for the manufacturing industry as a whole with and without controlling for
Table 1 Summary statistics of
the sample of Belgian firms
Variable Mean Median SD
Turnover (1,000 euro) 24,495 3,048 156,195
Employment 78 17 305
Material costs (1,000 euro) 18,578 1,917 131,661
Tangible fixed assets 4,062 472 25,819
Labor cost per worker (1,000 euro) 35.6 34.1 17.7
Labor cost share in turnover 0.22 0.20 0.13
Material costs share in turnover 0.66 0.67 0.16
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the bargaining power of the union. Table 2 reports the results for the markup and
bargaining power in the combined sample of all manufacturing companies.8
In column (1) we report a simple OLS estimate of Eq. 6. Column (2) and (3) show
OLS and fixed effects estimates of Eq. 11 respectively where we control for the
bargaining power of firms. In column (4) we adopt the Olley–Pakes methodology to
Eq. 11 and include a fourth-order polynomial of both present and lagged capital and
investment to correct for potential endogeneity of the righthand-side variables.
Column (5) shows OLS results for the subsample used to apply the Olley–Pakes
correction. Finally, in column (6) results are reported of the specification where the
rents unions and firms bargain over take material costs into account. All equations
are estimated with year and industry dummies, capturing time and industry specific
shocks.9
From column (1), it can be seen that the average price over marginal cost ratio
in Belgian manufacturing is around 1.29. This increases in column (2) to 1.35
when we take into account that unions bargain over wages and employment with
employers. The Olley–Pakes correction in the last column does not affect our
results all that much when we compare the coefficients with those obtained by
performing normal OLS on the same subsample.10 This is in accordance with
Harrison (1994) and Boulhol et al. (2007) who report very close results when
comparing their fixed effects and IV estimates. The fact that the average markup
is smaller when the bargaining power of firms is not taken into account is
expected as the bargaining power term is negatively correlated with the markup
term. As can be seen from the last column, the estimated union bargaining power
is higher when the rents that are bargained over, are net of material costs. This is
in line with our expectations as discussed in the previous section. The estimates of
the average markup are in agreement with earlier work by Konings et al. (2001)
who report for Belgium an average markup of 1.28 without controlling for
imperfections in the labor market. These findings are also consistent with the
results found by Dobbelaere (2004) and Cre´pon et al. (2007), who estimate an
average markup and bargaining power for Belgium and France of 1.49 and 1.42
respectively.
How important are sectoral differences in markups and levels of bargaining
power? To address this question, we estimated Eq. 11 for each 2-digit NACE sector
separately.11 The estimated sectoral markups12 are reported in Fig. 2. The markup
8 All tables report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The adjusted R2 is
reported for all regressions. In specifications with firm fixed effects, the within R2 is shown.
9 The estimations were also done with interactions between time and industry dummies. This did not
change the results.
10 Note that the estimation equation is already in first differences such that part of the possible
simultaneity bias has already been accounted for in the OLS estimations.
11 Tobacco products (NACE 16), Leather (NACE 19), Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (NACE
23), Office machinery and computers (NACE 30), Audio, TV and Telecommunication apparatus (NACE
32) and other transport equipment (NACE 35) are excluded due to too few observations for reliable
estimates.
12 We computed the accounting Lerner index as PQwLzMPQ and compared the results with the estimated
Lerner index. The correlation coefficient between the two measures equals 0.72.
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ranges from 1.19 to 1.54. It is not surprising to find Pulp and Paper Products,
Furniture and Manufacturing n.e.c. and Wearing Apparel among the low markup
sectors since these are all low technology sectors. A similar reasoning can be
applied to explain high markups in Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments and
Electrical Machinery. These are both high technology sectors with substantial
research and development (R&D) expenditures. Typically such sectors need higher
markups to recoup the sunk R&D investment (Konings et al. 2001). Another sector
with a relatively high markup is Publishing and Printing which is characterized by
a low amount of international trade. More generally, relating the Lerner index
estimates with a measure of foreign competition, namely import penetration, results
in a correlation of -0.30. When we split up import penetration by country of origin,
only imports from low-wage countries are relatively strong correlated with the
markup estimates, namely the correlation coefficient equals -0.40. This issue will
be further investigated in the next sections. Figure 3 shows the bargaining power per
2-digit NACE sector. In order to check whether these estimates are sensible we
compared them with a wage over labor productivity ratio. We expect this ratio to be
higher in sectors characterized by higher union bargaining power. The correlation
between the two is indeed positive and equal to 0.48.
Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, we observe that sectors with higher markups are often
sectors with stronger union bargaining power. For instance, the sector of Electrical
Machinery has the highest bargaining power, which coincides with high markups.
At the other end of the range, for example the Furniture sector is characterized by
both a low bargaining power and markup. The statistically significant correlation
coefficient between the two parameters equals 0.56.13 Those results suggest that
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Fig. 2 Markup per NACE 2-digit sector
13 The same exercise was done using different depreciation levels to compute investment to correct for
the unobservable productivity growth using Olley–Pakes. We also experimented with a system GMM
estimator as in Blundell and Bond (1998), using lagged employment and output as instruments. The
results did not change.
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unions are able to negotiate successful deals in sectors with substantial economic
rents but find limited room for wage gains in competitive sectors where the average
markup is low.14
The Marshall rules of derived demand may provide some insights for the
interpretation of the observed patterns. The second law states that the demand for
labor will be more elastic, the greater the own-price elasticity of demand for the
output it produces. It is clear that the Lerner index equals the inverse of the own-
price elasticity, i.e., a lower Lerner index coincides with a more elastic demand.
In view of this fact, it is not surprising that unions tend to organize themselves
in sectors with higher price-cost margins since labor demand is less elastic in
these sectors. As a result, higher wage claims will not lead to large employment
cutbacks.
4.3 The impact of globalization
In this section we turn to the impact of globalization on markups and union
bargaining power. Therefore, we include interactions between globalization
variables and the regressors shown in Eqs. 6 and 11. The estimated coefficients
for these interactions can be interpreted as marginal effects of the variables on
markups and bargaining power. We opt for this strategy because it allows us to
directly measure the impact of international competition on the parameters of
interest without having to estimate them directly at the industry/year
level. Moreover, we are able to use the variables that capture international
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Fig. 3 Bargaining power per NACE 2-digit sector
14 This is consistent with for example Stewart (1990) who finds significant union-non-union wage
differentials in firms with market power, but no wage differentials in firms operating in a highly
competitive environment. However, note that the lack of a union wage differential in the competitive
sector can also be due to the absence of economic rents besides differences in union bargaining power.
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competition at the most disaggregated level,15 i.e., we use import penetration at
the 4-digit NACE level, where import penetration in sector j is defined as
importsjt
importsjt þ productionjt :
In Table 3 results of this exercise are shown. Columns (1)–(3) report OLS
estimates, column (4) repeats the specification of column (3) but with firm fixed
effects included and columns (5)–(7) report the same specifications but with the
Olley–Pakes correction. We start by augmenting Eq. 11 with import penetration and
interactions of import penetration with the right-hand-side variables in Eq. 11, to
test whether international competition is associated with lower markups and lower
union bargaining power. Whenever the interaction between a variable and the
Lerner index term or bargaining term is included, the variable itself also enters the
equation.
As discussed in Sect. 2, we expect that import competition lowers markups as
more import competition disciplines firm price setting behavior. Moreover there are
reasons to believe that import competition lowers union bargaining power. Binmore
et al. (1986) show how bargaining power can be determined by the perceived risk of
both parties that bargaining will break down. So, if unions think globalization
increases the risk of firms leaving the bargaining table, their bargaining power will
drop. In the same line of reasoning, Dumont et al. (2006) claim that bargaining
power can be considered as a measure of the credibility of the respective outside
options. As globalization increases the credibility of the firm leaving the bargaining
round, sectors with higher import penetration should be associated with lower
bargaining power.
From Table 3 we note that import penetration has indeed a negative and
significant effect on the markup and on the bargaining power of unions.16 In
particular, from column (7) it can be noted that a hypothetical autarkic sector
would have a Lerner index of 0.258. A sector evaluated at the average import
penetration rate (50%) has only a Lerner index of 0.234. This means that a sector
facing the average amount of foreign competition has a 10% lower price-cost
margin than a sector facing no import competition. Similar, unions are able to
capture 13% of the rents in sectors with no import competition while they only
15 It would be practically infeasible to apply some kind of two-step approach where in a first step mark-
ups and bargaining power are estimated for each industry/year combination and in a second step these
estimates are related to globalization variables. This because of the limited amount of firms in each 4-digit
NACE industry.
16 Belgium is characterized by a large amount of importing/re-exporting activities about which there is
no detailed data available to our knowledge. However, the interpretation of our results holds as long as
sectors characterized by large importing/re-exporting activities do not have lower mark-ups and union
bargaining power because of reasons other than international trade. The importing/re-exporting
introduces measurement error in our import penetration variable and as a result our estimated coefficient
for the impact of international trade is biased towards zero. However, the coefficient remains significantly
negative, so our estimate of the impact of import penetration can in a way be interpreted as a conservative
measure of the real impact of import penetration.
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capture 11% in sectors with average import competition, which means a
difference of 15%.17
In columns (3) and (6) we add a dummy LARGE which equals one if the firm has
more than 50 employees. We interact this dummy with both the bargaining and
Lerner term. The interaction with bargaining captures an essential aspect of firm
level bargaining in the Belgian economy. Large firms have different legal
obligations for union representation than small firms. In large firms it is moreover
easier to organize a strike which can put pressure on the negotiations. Hence we
expect the estimated union bargaining power to be higher in large firms. Indeed, the
coefficient on the interaction between LARGE and the bargaining term is positive,
but not statistically significant from zero.
In this same specification we also check whether the share of employment in
foreign firms18 in total sectoral employment matters for the bargaining power. One
would expect this interaction to be negative since multinationals may be more
footloose than domestic firms and as a result unions fear multinationals will
reallocate their production (Van Beveren 2007). The OLS and fixed effects
regressions find this to be the case, but this effect becomes insignificant when
applying the Olley–Pakes correction. Following the same line of reasoning, union
bargaining power in foreign firms is expected to be lower. However the coefficient
for the interaction between a foreign ownership dummy and the bargaining term is
insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that in Belgium most of the
bargaining takes place at the sectoral level.
Finally, the Lerner index was interacted with a foreign owner dummy. Most
theoretical and empirical literature shows that foreign firms are more efficient than
domestic firms and should therefore, all other things equal, be able to charge a
higher markup. The interactions show up to be positive but insignificant.
As noted above, import penetration itself is included in the regression. The
coefficient is positive and highly significant. Under the classical interpretation of the
left hand side variable in Eq. 11 as the Solow residual, this points to a positive
impact of international competition on productivity growth.
4.4 Origin of imports
The above results show that sectors with high import penetration rates tend to have
lower markups and union bargaining power. Now, we distinguish the import
penetration between different countries of origin. In our data set we observe for each
4-digit NACE sector the amount of imports coming from each country. We classify
17 The inclusion of import penetration on itself interacted with the Lerner and bargaining term, implies
that the marginal impact of an increase in import penetration is the same for a sector with high import
penetration rates as for sectors with low import penetration rate. To control for this, we also included
import penetration squared next to import penetration and interacted it with the right-hand-side variables.
As expected, the coefficient for the interaction between import penetration and the right-hand-side
variables was negative and the coefficient at the interaction with import penetration squared was positive.
This points towards smaller marginal effects of import penetration on mark-ups and bargaining for higher
import penetration rates. .
18 A foreign firm is a firm which has any foreign owner in 2004.
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all countries in four groups, namely imports from other EU-15 countries, imports
from the 10 new EU members, imports from OECD countries other than EU-25 and
countries other than EU-25 and OECD. The last category can be seen as a low-wage
countries group. Import penetration from country group k in sector j is now defined
as 19 IPjk ¼ importsjktotal importsj þ productionj such that IPj ¼
P4
k¼ 1 IPjk:
Over the past 10 years, especially imports from low-wage countries and the new
EU accession countries have increased. However, the bulk of imports still come
from other EU-15 countries. In 2004, almost 75% of Belgian imports came from
other EU-15 countries, while the new accession countries and low-wage countries
accounted for 2.4 and 12.1% respectively. The share of imports from OECD
countries other than EU-25 was 13.4%. We use imports by country of origin to
estimate whether markups are correlated differently with import penetration from
different countries. Results are shown in Table 4. The only interaction that is
strongly significant in all specifications is the one with imports from low wage
countries. Also the interaction between the bargaining term and import penetration
from new EU countries is significant in some specifications. Since both imports
from low-wage countries and EU accession countries show a clear upward trend, we
ran the regressions with year dummies interacted with the Lerner index and
bargaining power next to interactions with the import penetration variables. By
doing this exercise, interactions with import penetration from new EU countries
become insignificant as reported in the following section. The results for import
penetration from low-wage countries do not change.
Table 4 shows how competition from low wage countries tends to lower markups
and union bargaining power in Belgian manufacturing, and this for both the pooled
OLS results as for the equation with the Olley–Pakes correction. The results imply
that a sector facing high import competition from low wage countries (25%) has an
average price-cost margin of 0.197 while a sector characterized by no import
competition from low wage countries shows on average a Lerner index of 0.254.
Union bargaining power equals 0.13 and 0.10 in sectors with autarky and high import
competition from low-wage countries respectively. This is consistent with Bernard
et al. (2006) who show that plant survival and growth are negatively associated with
imports from low-wage countries. Because of the fear of firms exiting the market,
unions will be more reluctant to press for higher wages. Again as a robustness check,
we ran the same regression as in column (2) but now with firm fixed effects. Results
are reported in column (3) and show that the main conclusions hold also for this
specification. Note that import penetration from other EU-15 countries is signifi-
cantly positive in most specifications. Again, this points to productivity gains of
import competition from other EU countries. Imports from other regions have no
impact on productivity growth of Belgian manufacturing firms.
4.5 Year and sector heterogeneity
We previously showed that there exists large heterogeneity in markups across
different sectors. More exactly, markups range from 1.19 to 1.54 and union
19 For expositional reasons, time subscripts are omitted.
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bargaining power is between 0.08 and 0.18. Part of this heterogeneity can be
explained by differences in import competition as shown above. However, the
impact of globalization is not large enough to explain all differences in average
sectoral markups. As a robustness check, we repeated the regressions reported in
Tables 3 and 4 but now allowing for sector and year specific markups at the NACE
2-digit level and estimate an average effect of import penetration20 over all sectors
and periods. More specifically we interacted the Lerner term, bargaining term and
Dk with sector and year dummies. The estimation equation can be written as follows
SRit ¼ bI þ bt þ bIMPImportjt
   LERit
þ U
1  U
 
I
þ U
1  U
 
t
þ U
1  U
 
IMP
Importjt
 
 BARit
þ k
l
 
I
þ k
l
 
t
 
Dkit þ dImportjt þ aI þ at þ eit
The average Lerner index in period t and subsector j of sector I equals
bjt = bI ? bt ? b1MP*Importjt with Importjt the import penetration in subsector j.
The average union bargaining power can be derived in a similar way. Results are
reported in Tables 5 and 6. Column (1) and (2) report respectively the ordinary least
squares and fixed effects regression for the specification with sector dummies but
without time dummies. The set of sector-specific coefficients is not reported due to
space limitations. It can be seen that allowing for sector-specific markups and
bargaining power does not qualitatively change results. The coefficient of the
interaction between the Lerner term and total import penetration increases to -0.038,
but remains highly significant in the OLS specification. Also the magnitude of the
impact of competition from low-wage countries on the Lerner index drops
somewhat but keeps its significance in both specifications. The same conclusions
Table 5 Impact of import competition allowing for sector-specific Lerner index and union bargaining
power
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS1 FE OLS FE
Import
penetration 9 Lerner
-0.038 (0.018)** -0.031 (0.020) -0.035 (0.018)** -0.026 (0.019)
Import
penetration 9 bargaining
-0.058 (0.019)*** -0.055 (0.021)*** -0.054 (0.019)*** -0.049 (0.020)**
Import penetration 0.011 (0.002)*** 0.003 (0.014) 0.011 (0.002)*** 0.004 (0.014)
Sector dummies interacted
with RHS variables
X X X X
Year dummies interacted
with RHS variables
X X
Observations 27,337 27,337 27,337 27,337
Adj R2 0.409 0.414 0.395 0.399
No. of firms 5,491 5,491 5,491 5,491
20 Again, import penetration is defined at the 4-digit NACE level.
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can be drawn from comparing the impact of import penetration on union bargaining
power with and without sector heterogeneity in the parameters.
The last two columns of Tables 5 and 6 present results from OLS and fixed
effects regression with both sector and year specific markups and bargaining power.
The estimated impact of foreign competition does not differ qualitatively from those
reported in Tables 3 and 4 except for the impact of import penetration from EU
accession countries on union bargaining power, which drops in magnitude and loses
its significance.
4.6 Outsourcing
In recent years, outsourcing of intermediate inputs has developed at a fast pace. In
this section we attempt to measure the impact of outsourcing on markups and union
bargaining power. We expect intermediate imports to have a positive influence on a
firm’s markup because imported intermediates lower total costs and thus increase the
markup, all else equal (e.g., Amiti and Konings 2007). The impact of outsourcing on
union bargaining power is less clear. On the one hand, a high outsourcing degree of a
sector can lower the union bargaining power of a firm. This will be true when unions
fear that firms will outsource more of their production to low-wage countries if wages
are set too high. On the other hand, Kramarz (2003) suggests that bargained wages
will increase in a sector which uses intermediate imports since firms which buy their
intermediates abroad have to specify the amount of intermediates, their attributes,
etc. well in advance to the foreign producer. When the bargaining between union and
firm takes place, the intermediates are already ordered. This provides the unions with
hold-up opportunities.
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Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996) we measure outsourcing as the share of
imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate inputs.21 We observe both
variables directly from the Belgian input to output tables for the years 1995 and
2000.22 For the whole manufacturing sector (NACE 15 to 36) in the year 2000, 69%
of all intermediates were imported. In 1995, this percentage was 64%. Figure 4
shows the outsourcing measure for each 2-digit NACE sector (except for the
Tobacco industry). Sectors with the most imported intermediates are the Pulp and
Paper Products, Motor Vehicles, Office Machinery, and Radio, TV and Commu-
nication sectors. Among sectors with the lowest level of outsourcing are Food and
Beverages as well as Publishing and Printing, Fabricated Metals and Mineral
Products. Most sectors have witnessed an increase in their imported intermediates
between 1995 and 2000.
To measure the impact of outsourcing on bargaining, we interact the Lerner and
bargaining term with the outsourcing measure. To prevent that outsourcing also
captures import penetration, we decided to additionally interact the Lerner index
and bargaining term with import penetration. We do not only include the level of
outsourcing in the equations but also the growth in outsourcing.23 The results are
reported in Table 7. Columns (1)–(3) represent simple OLS estimates, columns (5)–
(7) show the same equations but with Olley–Pakes correction and column (4) shows
fixed effects estimates. The results show clearly that the growth in outsourcing is
positively correlated with both markups and union bargaining power while the level
of outsourcing has no significant effect. Increased outsourcing is likely to have a
positive impact on efficiency and productivity as suggested by a number of recent
papers (e.g., Girma and Go¨rg 2004). The results in Table 7 confirm this hypothesis.
While these results indicate that outsourcing is associated with efficiency gains, this
process could still coincide with job destruction as firms are contracting out tasks
which could be performed abroad more efficiently. We can also note that bargaining
power increases with increased outsourcing, which is consistent with the lock-in
story suggested by Kramarz (2003).
5 Conclusions
During the last decade, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic
integration. Within the EU, trade barriers were removed and the euro was
introduced. The EU has been enlarged with ten new member states and imports
from low wage countries have risen dramatically. Economic integration is likely to
have an impact on labor and product markets which are both characterized by
structural rigidities. Most papers study the impact of economic integration on
product and labor markets separately although they are clearly interlinked. Our
paper bridges this gap by looking at the link between globalization and product and
labor market imperfections simultaneously. To do this, we rely on a rich panel of
21 Intermediate inputs are defined as inputs coming from industrial sectors (NACE 15 to 36).
22 These tables are made every 5 years, the most recent was from 2005 and used data from 2000.
23 Growth = (outsourcing 2000 - outsourcing 1995)/outsourcing 2000.
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Belgian manufacturing firms. We use a model that allows us to estimate product
market power and union bargaining power simultaneously.
Several results emerge from our estimations. We show that union bargaining
power and product market power are positively correlated. Unions are able to
negotiate successful deals in sectors with high markups, while they are more
reluctant to press for high wage claims in more competitive sectors.
Concerning the impact of globalization, we find sectors with high import
penetration rates to have significantly lower markups and union bargaining power.
This result is consistent with the imports as market disciplining device and several
papers that look at the impact of globalization on union bargaining power.
Furthermore, we split up import penetration rates with respect to the country where
the imports come from. Especially imports from low wage countries are shown to be
concentrated in sectors characterized by low markups and bargaining power. Finally
we show that sectors that have been rationalizing their production process
by outsourcing part of their production, tend to have higher markups and union
bargaining power.
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